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The Growth and Development of Automatism
as a Defence in Criminal Law
JOHN JENNINGS"

It has long been a principle of English Common Law that for an
act to be punishable, it must be done voluntarily. As far back as
1884, Stephen J. stated that it was not open to doubt
that a man who, though he might be perfectly sane, committed what
would otherwise be a crime in a state of somnambulism, would be
entitled to be acquitted. And why is this? Simply because he would not
know what he was doing.1

Yet, as recently as 1951, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that there
are two recognized defences in law to a criminal charge; insanity and
drunkenness, and that anything falling outside those boundaries was
something unheard of and not be entertained. 2 In fact, until the last
decade, non-voluntary acts were held to exist in three categories
only:
(I) where the accused was insane;
(ii) where the act was done whilst the actor was asleep; and
(iII) where the act was literally not that of the accused as in the
classic situation in which A takes B's arm and with it strikes C.

However, the law in this field has, during these past ten years, undergone some change; it would now appear that without the presence of
any of the three conditions set out above, a man can commit an act
which is in no way voluntary. This newly-recognized condition has
been typed as non-insane automatism. It has become, or perhaps, is
becoming, a good defence to a criminal charge, resulting if established,
in an acquittal rather than the confinement which is the reward of
a 'successful' defence of insanity.
It will be the purpose of this report to examine the growth and
present position in criminal law of this defence of automatism, by
means of a review of the cases, and to offer solutions to the related
problems which the writer hopes will arise in the course of this
examination.
What are the characteristics of this state of automatism, other
than as indicated by the accused's typical statement that "I guess I
must have blacked out"? In the most recent case on the subject,
*Mr. Jennings is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1R. "v. Tobin (1882), 23 Q.B.D. 168, 187.
2 R. v. Kasperec, [1951] O.R. 776.
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the Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland said that automatism describes the state of a person who, though capable of action
is not conscious of what he is doing . . . it means unconsciousness
involving action, and it is a defence because the mind does not go with
what is being done.S
In similar language, the President of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal said
I would myself prefer to explain automatism simply as action without
any knowledge of
acting, or action with no consciousness of doing what
4
was being done.
Two things will be noted from these definitions. Firstly, what
might be called 'conscious' involuntary action, that is to say acts
the result of physical compulsion, or control of the mind by coercion
or duress, is not included. Secondly, the definition is wide enough
to encompass acts rendered unconscious by sleep, drunkenness, insanity, or some other causes. In this report, the writer wishes to deal
with those "automatic" acts that are rendered so by reason of
unconsciousness, as the definitions above-quoted suggest. Also, it is
hoped that, within this narrowed field of automatism, the survey may
be restricted further still to examine that state of unconsciousness
brought about by the "other causes" referred to above.
The first case of importance where automatism was a defence
is that of R. v. Charlson.5 There, the accused violently attacked his
young son with a mallet, and then flung him out of a window and into
a river twenty-five feet below. The accused was devoted to his son,
and there was no cause for the attack. Charlson admitted to the
police that he had assaulted the child, but said that he did not know
why he had done so. He was charged with grievous bodily harm with
intent, and with unlawful wounding. The prison doctor declared that
the accused was not suffering from any disease of the mind when
the assault took place. Evidence was led to show that there was a
strong possibility that Charlson was suffering from a cerebral tumor,
in which case he would be subject to motiveless outbursts of impulsive
violence over which he would have no control at all.
No plea of insanity was entered, and the only defence raised
was one of automatism. Barry J., thereupon instructed the jury that
the question was
whether the accused knew what he was doing when he struck those
blows ... if he did not ... if his actions were purely automatic and
his mind had no control over the movement of his limbs, if he was
in the same position as a person in an epileptic fit and no responsibility
rests on him at all, then the proper verdict is 'not guilty'. 6
The accused was acquitted.
3 Bratty

v. A.G. for Northern Ireland, [1961J 3 All E.R. 523, 527.

4 R. v. Cottle, E1958J N.Z.L.R. 999 at 1020.

56 [1955J 1 All E.P. 858.
Id. at 864.
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It is to be observed that this is a wide, liberal charge. Barry J.,
made no attempt to classify the unconscious state of the accused as
insanity. It would appear that the evidence of the doctor was accepted
by Barry J., to the effect that the accused's alleged state was not the
result of a disease of the mind. That is, the cause of the unconscious
condition was not a mental disease, but an organic illness. Accordingly, the M'Naghten Rules had no application, and although the
accused may not have known the nature and quality of his act, he
was allowed to leave the dock as a free man. By so ruling, the
court clearly recognized a 'middle ground' between sanity and insanity, an area to which no penal consequences would attach, or
mental institutions rule.
Char7son was considered with approval in the Canadian case of
R?. v. Minor7 where Martin C.J.S. held on appeal that it was a good
defence simply that the accused did not know what he was doing
when he 'committed' the offence charged.
In Minor, the defence set up was that the accused had received a
severe blow to the head and was suffering from a resulting concussion.
He would not, therefore, be said to be conscious when he was driving
his automobile in the manner alleged by the Crown. The trial judge
directed the jury that unless the accused was insane at the time of
the act, his lack of consciousness was no defence. In finding this
charge to be bad in law, Martin C.J.S. specifically disapproved of

Kasperek8 and its attempt to confine defences of unconscious action
to the realms of drunkenness and insanity.
In startling contrast to the Cihrlson case is R. v. Kemp.9 The
accused, an elderly man of previously unblemished character, struck
his wife on the head with a hammer. Here also, there was no rational
explanation for the assault. Kemp was charged with causing grievous
bodily harm.
At the trial, evidence was led to show that the accused was
suffering from arteriosclerosis which caused a congestion of blood
in the brain. Medical witnesses agreed that at the time of the attack
on his wife, Kemp was in a state of unconsciousness, caused by this
congestion of blood. The defence was non-insane automatism. Counsel
submitted that a 'disease of the mind' which attracted the M'Naghten
Rules did not include illnesses of an organic condition, such as
arteriosclerosis, but rather those illnesses of functional origin, such
as schizophrenia. Charlson was relied upon.
Devlin J., rejected counsel's attempts to classify disease, ruling
that the origin of the disease was

irrelevant for the purposes of the law, which is not concerned with the
origin of the disease or the cause of it, but simply with the mental
condition which has brought about the act.Jo
7

(1955), 15 W.W.R. 433.

8 [1951) O.R. 776.

9 [1956) 3 All E.R 249.
10Id. at 253.
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The learned judge then directed the jury that they ought to find the
accused was labouring under a defect of reason caused by a disease of
the mind, and that they should return a verdict of guilty but insane."
In an attempt to distinguish Kemp from Charson,Edwards wrote
What would seem, therefore, on outwardly similar facts to be conflicting
rulings .. are, in fact, explicable on the basis that whereas in Charison,
the medical evidence was agreed that no question arose of the accused
suffering from a disease of the mind, in Kemp... the medical evidence
led to the inescapable conclusion that arteriosclerosis is a disease
...
which is capable of affecting the mind in such a way as to cause2a defect,
temporarily or permanently, of the reason and understanding.'

With respect, this distinction is much too fine. It would seem obvious
that in both cases evidence of a physical injury contributing to, or
resulting in, a mental disorder was offered to substantiate a defence
of automatism. What has really happened, it is submitted, is that
Devlin J. has frowned upon Barry J.'s liberal charge, and narrowed
its application to cases other than those where a physical injury
results in a mental disorder. It is further submitted, therefore, that
Devlin J. must have considered Charlson wrongly decided, although
he did not say so in Kemp.
This conclusion is reinforced by a decision of the New Zealand
Court of Appeal in R. v. Cottle,13 where the court was unable to see
any grounds for distinguishing between the cause of the lack of
volition in Charlison, and of that in Kemp. Disapproving of Barry J.'s
finding on the evidence, the court said
if the automatism ...

is shown in evidence to be attributable to an

abnormal condition of the mind capable of being designated as a disease

of the mind, the judge should submit to the jury the question whether,
should not be expressed...
if there is to be an acquittal, the verdict
as an acquittal on account of insanity1 4

Glanville Williams, supporting Kemp, also disapproved of harlson. He thought that the evidence in the latter case was in substance
evidence of insanity, which if accepted ought to have resulted in a
verdict of insanity. 15 Although the charge in Charlson was not objected to as such, it should not have been applied, the learned author
reasoned, to a case where insanity was really at issue.
Hill v. Baxter'6 is the next case deserving attention. There, the
defendant drove his truck through a 'HALT' sign and collided with
a car. He was charged with dangerous driving and failing to conform
to a 'HALT' sign. Baxter's story was literally "I don't know what
happened," and his defence was that he was driving in a state of
11 It is to be noted that Devlin J. felt he could put the question of
insanity to the jury, even though it was not raised as a defence, presumably
on the grounds that the accused had put in issue his state of mind by asserting automatism. This is approved in Bratty, supra, footnote 3.
12 Automatism and Criminal Responsibility (1958), 21 M.LR. 375 at 378.
13 [19581 N.Z.L.R. 999.
at 1013 (per Gresson P.).
14Id.
15
CriminalLaw-The General Part2nd edit. p. 484.
16 [19581 1 All E.R. 193.
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automatism. He was acquitted by the magistrate on substantially his
own evidence.
On appeal to the Divisional Court, it was held that in this case
there was insufficient evidence to warrant a finding of automatism.
However, two interesting points were discussed by the Court in obiter.
With regard to the burden of proof in cases of automatism, Lord
Goddard stated,
undoubtedly the onus of proving that he was in a state of automatism
must be on [the defendant). This is not only akin to a defence of
insanity, but it is a rule of the law of evidence that the onus of proving
a fact which must be exclusively within the knowledge of a party lies
on him who asserts it.7
On the other hand, Devlin J., with whom Pearson J. concurred,
thought that insanity was the only defence in which the burden of
proof has been held to be completely shifted. [Automatism, by inference, is not in all cases insanity.] Devlin J. went on to say that
it is for the defence to lead evidence of automatism, but the persuasive
burden to prove every element of the crime [including its voluntariness] rests on the Crown throughout.
Secondly, the court suggested that in those offences in which
there is no question of mens rea, i.e., where the act is said to be
absolutely prohibited, a defence of automatism is still good. For
example, in the case of dangerous driving, it is no defence for the
accused to say 'I did not know I was driving dangerously'. However,
the fact that this offence is absolutely prohibited should only mean
that there is no need to prove a specific intent or general foresight
of consequences. It would still seem to be a defence to say that the
conduct - i.e. the driving, was involuntary.
Therefore, on this point, the court would appear to have held
that the defence of automatism involves the denial of an act in
criminal law and is not affected by absolute prohibitions.' 8
The questions raised, obiter, in Hill v. Baxter were discussed in
the following year by the Supreme Court of Victoria in the case of
9
R. v. Carter.1
The accused was charged with three counts; wounding one S
with the intent to murder him, wounding S with the intent to do him
grievous bodily harm, and driving a motor car on the highway in a
manner dangerous to the public.
The Crown alleged that Carter drove deliberately at S, a pedestrian. The defence was that at the time of the alleged offences, the
accused (a woman) was in a state of post-traumatic automatism,
1
1 78 Id.

at 196.
See: Pearson J., p. 149-"if [the defendant] is unconscious In the full
sense, he is not driving." See also Lord Goddard at p. 195-"there may be
cases where the circumstances are such that the accused could not really be
said to be driving at all."
19 [1959) V.R. 105.
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caused by an assault upon her by S about one hour earlier. Prior to
Counsel's addresses to the jury, Sholl J., gave rulings on three
important aspects of this defence.
Firstly, Sholl J. considered whether the defence amounted to one
of insanity requiring a direction in accordance with the M'Naghten
Rules. On this point, the learned judge considered that the defence
raised the issue of lack of volition to commit the offences, rather
than a defect of reason within the rules. However, and more important, if automatism did involve a defect of reason, Sholl J. was
not satisfied that the defect under which Miss Carter was allegedly
suffering could be said to arise from a 'disease of the mind'. The
learned judge considered the meaning of the expression 'disease of
the mind' was bound up with the practice established in England
in 1800 with the Trial of Lunatics Act - that of remanding into
custody a prisoner acquitted on the grounds of insanity in order to
protect the public from further violence by a person whose affliction
was likely to continue or re-occur. If this view was sound, the learned
judge thought it to be
quite outside the policy of the law to extend the practice [of applying
the Rules] to cases where there is no reason to fear any repetition of
the crime, and no evidence of any brain
2 0 damage or disease which is
likely to give rise to any such repetition.
Accordingly, Carter's defence was held to be distinct from one of
insanity, and if accepted, the proper verdict would be one of
acquittal. 21
It is submitted that this approach is both reasonable and sound.
It doesn't pretend to hold that all evidences of automatism, however
induced, are to be dealt with independently of the M'Naghten Rules.
If, as in Kemp, the situation arises where automatism is induced
by an abnormal state of mind, so that both cognition and volition are
affected, then the Rules apply and no outright acquittal is available.
Secondly, Sholl J. dealt with the question of the onus of proof
where automatism is sought to be established.
Where automatism is raised the position is the same as in the case of
drunkenness, provocation, and other such matters. The Crown is not
bound in the first instance to negative such possibilities.... It must be
for the defence in the first instance genuinely to raise the issue ... then
the Crown is bound in the long run to carry the ultimate onus of proving
all the 22elements of the crime including the conscious perpetration
thereof.
Sholl J. was aware that this decision, in line with the obiter
of Devlin J. in Hill v. Baxter might encourage attempts to raise
unmeritorious defences. Accordingly, he advanced the interesting
suggestion that legislation to avoid such evils be enacted, to the effect
that if automatism is to be raised notice should be given to the Crown
20 Id. at 110.
2
1 Carter was in fact, acquitted on all three charges.
22 [1959] V.R. 105, 111. The emphasis is added by the

writer.
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prior to trial, with an opportunity to examine the accused. The
penalty for non-observance would be the exclusion at trial of evidence
of the accused's mental state.23
Thirdly, Sholl J. dealt with the Crown's argument that automatism was not a defence to the charge of dangerous driving, because
that offence did not involve mens rea. This argument was rejected
as the court in Hill 'v. Baxter suggested it should be. Sholl J. held
that the fact that a guilty mind is not an element of the offence, is
quite distinct from the proposition that a complete lack of volition
to perform the acts involved in the offence means no offence is committed. That is, a man cannot be criminally responsible for acts of
which he is not conscious.2 4
What may be the final word on many of the issues contained in
the defence of automatism at least for those jurisdictions bound by
the House of Lords' decisions, is contained in a decision handed down
last October by that tribunal in the case of Bratty v. Attorney-General
for Northern Ireland.25 The facts taken from the headnote, are as
follows:
It was not open to dispute that the accused had killed a girl,
with whom he was driving in his car, by strangling her with one of
her stockings. He gave evidence that "a blackness" came over him,
and that "I didn't know where I was. I didn't realize anything". He
stated that he had previously experienced "feelings of blackness" and
headaches.
The deceased had not been the object of any obvious sexual
attack.
Medical evidence was led by the defence to suggest that the
accused might have been suffering from psychomotor epilepsy, which
was said to be a disease of the mind affecting the reason and which
could cause ignorance of the nature and quality of acts done. No
other pathological cause for the accused's acts or for a state of
automatism on his part was assigned by the medical evidence at
trial. The defences of automatism and insanity were raised at the
trial.
The trial judge refused to leave the defence of automatism to
the jury, but left to them the defence of insanity, which the jury
rejected. The accused was then convicted. Although the appeal to
the House of Lords was limited to two grounds, viz. whether the
defence of insanity having been rejected by the jury, it was open to
the accused to rely on a defence of automatism, and if so, whether
such defence should have been left to the jury, the court took the
*opportunity to discuss the whole question of automatism generally.
2

3Id. at 112.
I1. at 112-113.
25 [19611 3 All E.R. 523.
24
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On the questions presented to them for determination, the House
of Lords held that where the only cause alleged for an unconscious
or involuntary act is a defect of reason within the M'Naghten Rules,
and the jury reject a defence of insanity, there is no room for the
alternative defence of automatism.
However, both Viscount Kilmuir, L.C., and Lord Morris of
Borth-y-Gest were careful to point out that the rejection of the
plea of insanity does not of itself prevent the accused from raising
the alternative defence of automatism. Viscount Kilmuir envisaged
the somewhat unlikely situation where the accused received a blow
on the head, and there was a divergence of opinion whether or not
there was a defect of reason from a disease of the mind. The jury
could then reject the evidence of disease of the mind, yet find that
the accused did not know what he was doing, and acquit. Viscount
Kilmuir adds:
that the defence would only have succeeded because the necessary foun-

dation had been laid by evidence which, if properly considered, was
evidence of something other than a defect of reason from disease of
the mind.26

The situation envisaged is somewhat puzzling. How could it be
suggested that a man receiving a blow to the head was suffering from
a disease of the mind?2 Perhaps Viscount Kilmuir had in mind an
act done some months after the blow, by which time an organic
deterioration of the brain had set in. At any rate, the court in the
instant case found that all the evidence of involuntary conduct led
to the conclusion that there was, if anything, a disease of the mind
present, and under those circumstances there was no evidence to
support automatism, and it could not therefore be left to the jury.
This led the court to a consideration of the evidentiary burden
connected with the defence of automatism. On this point, all members of the court held that before a defence of automatism could be
left to the jury, a proper foundation must be laid for it by evidence
led at trial. That is, the court considered it quite unfair for the
accused to be allowed to say at the end of the Crown's case, "I am
not saying I was insane at the time of the act, but I am saying that
I was acting as an automatism, and you haven't proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that I was acting voluntarily", without introducing
medical evidence to that effect.
Referring with approval to 1B. v. Carter,Viscount Kilmuir stated:
for a defence of automatism to be genuinely raised in a genuine fashion,
there must be evidence on which a jury could find that a state of auto-

matism exists .

.

. the defence must be able to point to some evidence

from which the jury could reasonably infer that the accused acted
in a state of automatism. Whether or2 8not there is such evidence is a
matter of law for the judge to decide.
...

26
Id. at 528.
27

For a case of this sort see R. v. Minor (1955), 15 W.W.R. 433.

28 Id. at 530.
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To this, Lord Denning added with approval words from the obiter of
Devlin J. in Hill v. Baxter:
the defence of automatism ought not to be considered
at all until the
defence has produced at least prima facie evidence. 29

Lord Denning considered that the necessity for laying this proper
foundation rested upon the defence
and if it is not so laid, the defence of automatism need not be left to
the jury any more than the defences of drunkenness, provocation, or selfdefence need be.3 0

It will be noted that the court is only saying here that the
accused must lead evidence to support his defence of automatism.
Once such evidence is brought forth the court laid down the rule
that the burden of proving the act alleged was a conscious one
remained, as in all cases excepting those in which insanity is raised
as a defence, upon the Crown. On this point, Viscount Kilmuir
said that
once the defence ... have satisfied the judge that there is evidence fit
for the jury's consideration, the proper direction is that, if that3 1evidence
leaves them in a state of real doubt, the jury should acquit.

Lord Denning held that whereas the ultimate burden rests on
the Crown of proving every element in the crime, the Crown is
entitled to rely on the presumption that every man has sufficient
mental capacity to be responsible for his crimes. To displace the
presumption, the defence must lead evidence to the contrary, whereupon,
at the end of the day the legal burden comes into play and requires
that the jury 3be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was a
2
voluntary act.

Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest considered that once sufficient
evidence of automatism was advanced to merit consideration by
the jury:
then the onus which is on the prosecution would not be dislodged unless
the jury, having considered [the defence] were sure that guilt In regard
to the particular crime
charged was established so that they were left In
33
no reasonable doubt

These pronouncements finally lay to rest the will-o-the wisp
spawned by Lord Goddard in Hill v. Baxter, where the learned Chief
Justice suggested that a defence of automatism was akin to one of
insanity. If that were so, the defence would fail unless it were established that on a balance of probabilities, the acts complained of were
involuntary.
Two further observations made by Lord Denning should be noted.
Firstly, Lord Denning approved of the obiter in Hill v. Baxter, con29

Id. at 535.
3Old. at 535.
31 Id. at 532.
32 Id. at 536.
33 Id. at 533.
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sidering it a good defence to the so-called "absolute prohibition"
offences to show that the act was involuntary in the sense that the
accused was unconscious at the time and did not know what he was
doing. With regard to the dangerous driving line of cases, his Lordship thought that the offence would be committed if the accused
drove knowing he was subject to attacks of automatism, despite the
fact that he was unconscious at the actual time the car was out of
control.
Secondly, Lord Denning disapproved of Barry J.'s reasoning in
R. v. Clarkson, where the latter held that unconsciousness produced
by a cerebral tumor was not a disease of the mind within the
M'Naghten Rules. His Lordship said that it seemed to him
that any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and
is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any rate, it is the sort of
be detained in hospital rather than be
disease for which a person should
34

given an unqualified acquittal.

CONCLUSIONS
(a) The Nature of Automatism
A summation of the cases discussed presents the following picture of the attitude of the English courts to our subject.
There is in law a recognized defence to a criminal charge-that
of involuntary or unconscious action-called for convenience "automatism". Where the state of automatism is induced by a 'disease of
the mind', the accused will be found not guilty by reason of insanity,
and will be detained in a mental institution at Her Majesty's
Pleasure.
There is, however, an area within the field of automatism that
lies without the M'Naghten Rules; where the involuntary conduct
is the result of an unconscious state induced by something other than
a 'disease of the mind'. What is or is not a disease of the mind is a
matter for the determination of the trial judge.
In order to have his defence of automatism left to the jury, the
accused must introduce evidence tending to make it a reasonable
assumption that he was in fact in such a state as he alleges. Once
such evidence is introduced, the onus is on the Crown to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's actions were voluntary.
The defence may be offered as an alternative to the defence of
insanity, provided that evidence to support non-insane automatism,
that is, evidence other than that of 'disease of the mind' is introduced.
Automatism is a good defence to an act 'absolutely prohibited'
on the ground that, because of the unconscious state, there was no act.
By leading evidence of non-insane automatism, the accused puts
his mental state in issue, and the Crown is entitled to lead evidence
to show that the accused was insane.
34

Id. at 534.
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(b) Evils and PossibleRemedies
If the picture presented is an accurate summary of the English
law on the subject, a remarkably narrow field is left open to noninsane automatism. It would appear that the law has been established more in the rejection of the defence than in the application.
With the exception of 1. v. Carter,the courts have been reluctant to give any scope to the defence due, no doubt, to the difficulties
foreseen if any accused could argue as an excuse for a criminal act
that he "simply blacked out". Yet it has been established that sound
evidence must be laid to give rise to the defence, and Lord Denning
suggested in Bratty that no evidence of automatism could be accepted
unless it came from a qualified medical practitioner. Coupled with
Scholl J.'s suggestion in Carter that the defence must give notice,
a sufficient safeguard should be found to satisfy the most uneasy
court. 35
Also alarming is Lord Denning's statement in Bratty as set out
above, that "any mental disorder which has manifested itself in
violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind", and consequently must attract the verdict of not guilty because of insanity.
His Lordship justifies this conclusion by the sentiment that such
people are better locked up.
Two elements of his Lordship's opinion are objectionable. Firstly,
it is the unfortunate truth that in many instances confinement in a
mental institution is little different from a prison sentence, and often
at least as lengthy.
Secondly, there would seem to be many illnesses which become
'disorders of the mind' within Lord Denning's definition that can be
cured by the surgeon's knife or the physician's prescription. Such
mal-functions as diabetes, or the cerebral tumor in Charlson,or petit
mal epilepsy with its momentary 'black-out' period, could all be said
to fit within the definition above-quoted. Indeed, His Lordship specifically disagreed, in Bratty, with Barry J.'s finding in Charlson to
the effect that epilepsy and tumor were outside the M'Naghten
requirements for 'disease of the mind'.
The logical and, it is submitted, ludicrous, result of Lord Denning's viewpoint is seen in the position of a diabetic without his
insulin. He will experience a black-out, and subsequent 'unconscious'
involuntary action. Surely this man cannot be found insane.
It is submitted that there is room here for legislation, or a
strong stand by the courts that would relieve sufferers from these
illnesses from the unfortunate necessity of relying on the defence of
insanity. The legislation would be such that a court would have a
greater degree of control over these victims of "fringe" ailments. It
35 See on
this, Devlin J. in Hill v. Baxter, and Williams CriminaZ LaowGeneral Part-2nded. p. 482.
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might be possible for an accused to get a conditional discharge,
subject to his undergoing the proper surgical or medical treatment to
cure his complaint, and prevent a recurrence of the unconsciousness.
Also, liability for criminal acts might be founded in negligence,
so if our diabetic was acquitted once of a criminal charge, we could
consider him to be warned. Then, should his black-out recur because
of his lack of care in taking his insulin, the defence of automatism
would not be open a second time, as he himself would be at fault.
If the second offence was unlawful homicide, the accused could then
be convicted of manslaughter.
This would prevent the man who in all conscience cannot be
called 'insane' in the accepted sense of the word, from being incarcerated for an involuntary blackout that can be controlled. The
warning system would mean that for his second involuntary act,
he would be held to stricter account. It has been said that "this
like the proverbial dog, should generwould mean that the diabetic,
36
lapse."
one
to
entitled
be
ally
Lastly, the courts might base their decisions on "disease of the
mind or not" on the question of the likelihood of repetition. An
example would be the case of an emotionally-distraught mother
becoming hysterical and killing her 13 month old child. In such a
situation, the standard used by Sholl J. in Carter to determine the
factors behind the application of the Rules should be looked to.
There may be little danger here of the mother harming again, afid
although she might vegetate by herself for the remainder of her life,
her very harmlessness should be considered, and a verdict of not
guilty rendered on the defence of automatism.
It is suggested that this might even be acceptable to Lord
Denning who seemed to have doubts about his definition of insanity,
as he qualified it subsequently with the thought that, at any rate,
repetitive crimes the result of 'black-out' must be found to be the
result of an insane mind.
(c) General
It is finally submitted that in the relatively virginal state of
our law on the subject, the fledgling defence of automatism must be
nurtured into health. Our courts must not allow it to waste away
on a diet of distrust, distaste, and nervousness. Our judges must be
prepared to see that medical science can prove in some cases that
a state of automatic action exists in which the actor is entirely sane.
The great gift of automatism as a defence is that this person does
not have to face the unhappy alternatives of prison or the mental
institution.
Automatism need not be the last refuge of desperate defence, as
many critics have suggested. The evidentiary burdens as established,
36 Prevazer: Automatism and Criminal Responsibility [19581 Cr. 1,R. 361.
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finally, in Bratty should protect against this. Yet when a case of
non-insane automatism is "genuinely raised", it must be given effect,
and if accepted, the accused must be discharged. If this is not done,
for any offence short of murder, the accused has the unhappy choice
of pleading insanity, or pleading guilty, and
to brand as criminals persons to whom no moral fault can be imputed,
and who, through no fault of their own, committed an act..
Which
must be regarded as involuntary ..
must be avoided .. for such a
course would undoubtedly tend to weaken respect for the law and
evenually bring the law into disrepute.37
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